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HALBERSTAM V. DANIEL AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE




Criminal misuse of firearms is a widespread social problem in
America. Each year, more than 600,000 violent crimes involving
firearms are reported in the United States.' Gun murders have sur-
passed car accidents as the leading cause of unnatural death in New
York, California, and Texas.2 As a result, many crime victims and
their families have turned to the tort system seeking compensation
for their losses.
Since the early 1980s, victims and their families have filed
dozens of lawsuits against firearms manufacturers for their role in
making weapons widely available for criminal misuse. To date,
none of these lawsuits has been successful, and only one case has
ever reached a jury. That case, Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc.,3
signals the uncertain future of tort claims against firearms manu-
facturers by crime victims. On the one hand, the Halberstam plain-
' 01998 Timothy D. Lytton. All Rights Reserved. This brief note on the
Halberstam case raises a variety of policy issues beyond the scope of the narrow
doctrinal analysis presented here. I shall address these larger issues in a more
comprehensive examination of tort claims against firearms manufacturers that is currently
in progress.
I Associate Professor, New York Law School. I wish to thank the following
colleagues for their help and encouragement: Rachel Anisfeld, Jim Brook, Billie Coleman,
Sergio Cucci, John Goldberg, Karen Gross, Randy Jonakait, Grace Lee, Arthur Leonard,
Steve Newman, Ed Purcell, Ed Samuels, Ross Sandler, Tony Sebok, Peter Schuck,
Richard Sherwin, Steve Smith and Harry Wellington. I received generous support for this
project from a New York Law School summer research grant.
1 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: SELECTED
FINDINGS FROM NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERIES 3 (1994)).
2 Donna Morel, Bang! Bang! You're Liable! The Imposition of Strict Liability on the
Makers of Semi-Automatic Assault Weapons, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 263 (1995).
3 No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (pleadings and court orders on file in clerk's
office at the U.S. District Court for the Eastem District of New York).
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tiffs managed to obtain unprecedented jury consideration of their
claim, successfully overcoming several doctrinal obstacles that had
frustrated previous lawsuits and resulted in their dismissal. On the
other hand, having reached the jury, the Halberstam plaintiffs failed
to present sufficient evidence to substantiate the alleged link be-
tween the arms industry and violent crime. Thus, while the
Halberstam case offers new hope to future plaintiffs of avoiding
dismissal of their claims, it also provides a sober warning that plain-
tiffs will ultimately fail if they continue to rely on highly speculative
arguments linking firearms manufacturers to gun violence.
In lawsuits prior to Halberstam, plaintiffs made multiple claims
against defendant-manufacturers under a variety of theories. Most
plaintiffs made products liability claims, alleging that the lethal
nature of firearms constituted a design defect for which defendant-
manufacturers could be held strictly liable. Courts dismissed these
claims on the ground that plaintiffs could not recover under design
defect theory unless they alleged a particular defective condition in
the firearm that caused it to malfunction.' While well-made firearms
that function precisely as designed might be dangerous, they are not
defective.' To avoid the need to identify a defect, some plaintiffs
prior to Halberstam also made negligence claims, alleging that the
manufacture and sale of firearms to the general public created an
unreasonable risk of harm. Courts dismissed these claims too, hold-
ing that a manufacturer owes no duty to refrain from legally
marketing a non-defective product to the general public.6
4 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1997) (ammuni-
tion not defectively designed); Moore v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1986); Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir.
1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985); Hamilton,
935 F. Supp. at 1323; Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987);
Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Patterson v.
Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp 1206, 1207, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger
Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 108, 110 (D. Mass 1983); DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co.,
509 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So. 2d 649,
650 (Fla. 1986); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (111. 1985);
Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1148-50 (Md. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's de-
sign defect claim, allowing novel "Saturday Night Special" strict liability theory); Rich-
ardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. 1987); Fomi v. Ferguson, 232 A.D.2d
176, 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73-74 (1st Dep't 1996).
s See James Henderson & Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1297-1316
(1991) (arguing against "product-category liability"). But see Symposium on Generic Prod-
ucts Liability, 72 CH.-KENT L. REv. (1996) (offering a variety of arguments against
Henderson & Twerski in favor of "generic products liability').
6 See, e.g., Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 157; Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1533-34; Armijo,
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The Halberstam plaintiffs, seeking to avoid the products liabili-
ty requirement of alleging a defect in the firearm, sued under a
negligence theory, relying in part on negligent entrustment doc-
trine.7 To avoid precedents rejecting a duty to refrain altogether
from marketing firearms,' they argued in favor of a more modest
duty owed by manufacturers to the general public to adopt reason-
able restraints on marketing. If the plaintiffs could get the court to
recognize a duty to adopt reasonable restraints on marketing, then
they might convince a jury that particular features of the defendant's
promotion and distribution of its weapons constituted a breach of
this duty, one that proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
In their successful effort to obtain jury consideration of their
claim, the Halberstam plaintiffs overcame three previously insur-
mountable doctrinal obstacles to judicial recognition of a duty of
care in negligent marketing claims against firearms manufacturers.
The first obstacle was a long-standing refusal by courts to apply
negligent entrustment doctrine to firearms manufacturers who mar-
keted their weapons to the general public.9 In commercial settings,
liability based on negligent entrustment arises from selling potential-
ly harmful products to consumer groups that lack the capacity to
exercise ordinary care. For example, a merchant may be subject to
liability for selling air rifles to small children.'0 Marketing a prod-
uct to the general public, however, cannot be negligent under this
656 F. Supp. at 775; Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1983);
First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark. 1995);
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989); Trespalacios, 486 So. 2d at
651; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1296; Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340
(111. 1984); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Mich. 1997); Forni,
232 A.D.2d at 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74; Knott v. Liberty jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748
P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. 1988).
" The doctrine of negligent entrustment states that a person may be subject to liabil-
ity for harm that results from entrusting a potentially dangerous object to another whom
the giver has reason to know is likely to use it in a manner that poses an unreasonable
risk of harm to the recipient or to others. For example, a person may be subject to lia-
bility for entrusting a loaded gun to a small child who, while playing with it, injures
herself or another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1986) and discussion of
negligent entrustment doctrine infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 156-57; Forni, 232 A.D.2d at 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d
at 74.
9 See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1295-96; Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340.
10 See, e.g., Semenuik v. Chentis, 117 N.E.2d 883 (111. 1954); Earsing v. Nelson, 212
A.D.2d 66, 629 N.Y.S.2d 563 (4th Dep't 1995); Sickles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6
Misc. 2d 1000, 167 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1957); Henningsen v.
Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547, 230 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1928).
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doctrine, since the general public, itself, sets the standard of ordi-
nary care. The Halberstam plaintiffs successfully argued that negli-
gent entrustment doctrine could be applied to firearms manufactur-
ers who marketed their weapons to consumers "likely to be
involved in criminal activity.""
The second obstacle was a tendency among courts to view
negligent marketing claims against firearms manufacturers as being
essentially design defect claims in disguise and to insist that plain-
tiffs allege a defective condition in the weapon in order to recov-
er. 2 Since plaintiffs who asserted negligent marketing claims often
emphasized the dangerous nature of firearms and alleged a duty to
refrain from marketing them, judges viewed these claims as practi-
cally identical to design defect claims that focused on the dangerous
characteristics of guns and sought to stop production of them. The
Halberstam plaintiffs, by alleging a duty of care that demanded
reasonable restrictions on marketing without completely prohibiting
the promotion and sale of weapons, clearly distinguished their
negligent marketing claim from design defect theory and avoided
the need to allege a defect in the firearm.
The third obstacle was the refusal of courts to hold defendants
liable for injuries inflicted by the intervening intentional, criminal
misconduct of third parties in the absence of a special custodial
relationship between the defendant and the third party or a special
protective relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. 3
" Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 3, Halberstam v. S. W. Daniel, Inc., No.
95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
12 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(Weinstein, J.); Derosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Weinstein, J.); cf. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 163 n.13 (2d Cir. 1997)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 156-57; First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin
Eng'g Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark. 1995); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758,
762 (D.C. 1989); see also, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (al.
1976) (duty of therapist to warn third parties of threats by patient); Nallan v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 518, 407 N.E.2d 451, 457, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (1980)
(duty of landowner to protect visitors from criminal acts of third parties); Einhom v.
Seely, 136 A.D.2d 122, 126, 525 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (1st Dep't 1988) (There will ordi-
narily be no duty thrust on a defendant to prevent a third party from causing harm to
another. The exception may occur in the case where a special relationship exists be-
tween the defendant and the third person so as to give rise to a duty to control, or
altematively, when a special relationship exists between the defendant and the victim
which gives the latter the right to protection.); Stevens v. Kirby, 86 A.D.2d 391, 393,
450 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (4th Dep't 1982) (duty of tavem owner to protect patrons from
criminal acts of third parties). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
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Thus, courts have held that defendant-firearms manufacturers have
no duty to take reasonable precautions against the possibility of
crimes committed by third parties using a gun that the defendant-
manufacturer marketed. No court has yet recognized a special rela-
tionship that would support such a duty, and the Halberstam plain-
tiffs alleged none. Instead, they argued that firearms manufacturers
owe a duty to the public to take precautions against the intentional,
criminal misuse of their products where their own promotion and
distribution of weapons contribute to the risk of such misuse.
The Halberstam case represents a significant advance in at-
tempts to impose a duty on firearms manufacturers to exercise rea-
sonable restraint in marketing their weapons. The value of the case,
however, should not be overstated. While the plaintiffs did avoid
dismissal of their negligent marketing claim, the judge issued no
written opinion which might provide support to similar claims in
the future. Thus, the case should be viewed principally as a guide
to litigation strategy rather than any sort of legal precedent. Further-
more, the jury verdict in Halberstam highlights the lack of evidence
available to establish the alleged causal connection between
manufacturers' aggressive marketing of guns and criminal misuse of
them.
Although the Halberstam case ought not occasion excessive
optimism among the plaintiffs' bar nor overconfidence on the part
of defense counsel, it does provide a useful opportunity to reflect
upon many issues surrounding negligent marketing claims in gener-
al. One such issue is the role that marketing plays in the creation
and maintenance of markets. Another issue is determining who is
responsible when legal markets facilitate criminal activity. Further
study of both of these issues will be essential in resolving the uncer-
tain future of negligent marketing claims against firearms
manufacturers.
Part I of this Article describes the facts, procedural history and
trial of the Halberstam case. Part II analyzes the case, focusing on
the three doctrinal obstacles to establishing a duty of care in negli-
gent marketing cases that the Halberstam plaintiffs managed to
overcome in order to reach the jury. Part III briefly discusses re-
maining difficulties for future plaintiffs seeking to bring negligent
marketing claims and identifies unresolved public policy issues
raised by the Halberstam case.
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 201-03 (5th ed. 1984).
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I. HALBERSTAM V. DANIEL
On February 25, 1994, the Jewish holiday of Purim, Baruch
Goldstein massacred 29 Palestinian worshippers at a mosque in the
city of Hebron, Israel.' 4 Four days later, on March 1, in apparent
retaliation for the Hebron Massacre, Palestinian Rashid Baz opened
fire using two automatic pistols on a van carrying Hasidic Jewish
children across the Brooklyn Bridge. One of the pistols was a
Cobray M-1 1/9 which fired eighteen shots in just a few seconds. A
bullet from this pistol struck and killed sixteen year-old Aaron
Halberstam. Another bullet from either the Cobray M-11/9 or the
other pistol struck and injured his companion Nachum Sosonkin.
The Cobray M-11/9 was assembled from parts manufactured and
marketed through mail-order assembly kits by a company owned by
Wayne and Sylvia Daniel.
Baz was subsequently convicted of the crime and sentenced to
life in prison.1 After his trial, Baz denied that he had purchased
the Cobray M-1 1/9, or parts for it, directly from any of the Daniels'
companies. Presumably, he acquired it from an acquaintance or
bought it on the black market.
Aaron Halberstam's parents and Nachum Sosonkin filed suit
eighteen months later on August 14, 1995, seeking $5 million in
compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. 6
Their initial complaint named Baz and the Daniels as defendants
and set forth a variety of counts including assault, battery and negli-
gent marketing. 7 The plaintiffs' negligent marketing counts were
based on two distinct theories. First, the plaintiffs argued that mar-
keting semi-automatic pistols by means of mail-order assembly kits
violated federal and state firearms regulations and, therefore, consti-
14 THE JERUSALEM REPORT Vol. IX, no. 1, p. 160 (1998).
s Daniel Wise, Victors Enjoy Win in Gun Liability Case, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 30, 1998, at
1.
16 Index to Pleadings at 1, Halberstam, No. 95 Civ. 3323 (on file with author);
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at pp. 35-36. The plaintiffs, Brooklyn residents,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The
court, exercising diversity jurisdiction over the case, applied New York law. Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint at 4.
17 Memorandum of Devorah and David Halberstam and Nachum Sosonkin in Oppo-
sition to the Motions to Dismiss by S.W. Daniel, Inc.; Mountain Accessories Corporation;
Cobray Firearms, Inc.; F.M.J., Inc.; The Ultra Force, Inc.; Sylvia Daniel and Wayne Dan-
iel at 12-13 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' First Memorandum].
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tuted negligence per se. 8 Second, they argued that, aside from
any violation of statutory regulations, the Daniels were negligent in
their failure to exercise reasonable care in marketing their weap-
ons. 9 Rashid Baz, who was in prison following a criminal convic-
tion for the shooting, did not defend against the suit, and the court
entered a default judgment against him.2" The Daniels filed a
motion to dismiss.
At the hearing on the Daniels' motion to dismiss held on
March 18, 1997, Judge Jack B. Weinstein dismissed all counts of
the plaintiffs' complaint except the negligent marketing count.2
Judge Weinstein ruled against the negligence per se theory, prefer-
ring to treat the statutory regulations as part of the overall context
within which to determine the reasonableness of the defendants'
conduct in marketing their weapons.22 The judge issued no written
memorandum on this ruling despite a request for one by the defen-
dants, and he rejected their motion for an interlocutory appeal.23
Following this ruling, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint
setting forth a claim based solely on the theory of negligent market-
ing.24 In support of their negligent marketing claim, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants owed a duty to the public to exercise
reasonable care in marketing their product.2" They further alleged
that the defendants breached this duty by marketing the Cobray
M-11/9 pistol to customers especially likely to engage in criminal
misuse of the weapon.26 In support of this allegation, the plaintiffs
18 Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at i, ii.
19 Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at i, ii.
=°As Baz had no assets, the plaintiffs never sought execution of the judgment
against him.
21 Transcript of Motion before the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, U.S.D.J., Mar. 18, 1997,
9:30 a.m. at 41-43 (on file with the author).
" Transcript of Motion, Mar. 18, 1997 at 41-47. Judge Weinstein's ruling on the
plaintiffs' negligence per se claim is somewhat ambiguous. He did not rule that the doc-
trine of negligence per se did not apply to the Halberstam case. Nor did he rule, as
argued by the defendants, that the extensive regulatory regime goveming the distribution
and sale of 'firearms' cited by the plaintiffs did not apply to 'firearms parts.' Defen-
dants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 15 [hereinafter
Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss]. Judge Weinstein did, however, express an aversion
to the 'esoteric and complex' nature of the negligence per se doctrine and a desire to
engage the jury in a contextualized evaluation of the defendants' conduct rather than an
exercise in statutory interpretation. Transcript of Motion at 4143.
Transcript of Motion, Mar. 18, 1997 at 4546.
24 See generally Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 28.
26 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 3, 13, 24, 28, 29, 33.
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cited ads for the Cobray M-1 1/9 promoting it as "The Gun that
Made the '80s Roar" and boasting of "the controversial 'Drug Lord'
choice of COBRAY firearms throughout the '80s." The ads regularly
featured a cartoon of an Al Capone-style gangster in a pin-striped
suit and fedora wielding a submachine gun. In addition, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' sales procedures were de-
signed to allow criminal purchasers to avoid federal and state re-
strictions on firearms possession and transfer.28 The defendants
sold the Cobray M-11/9 in the form of mail- and phone-order as-
sembly kits. Since these sales involved firearm parts and not assem-
bled weapons, they were not subject to normal firearm sales and
licensing regulations. Moreover, gun parts sold in this fashion were
not required to, and did not, bear a serial number by which they
could be traced back to the manufacturer or to registered owners.29
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' breach of duty was
a factual and proximate cause of the shooting and resulting
injuries.3"
The plaintiffs' claim relied upon the widely accepted doctrine
of negligent entrustment.3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 390 defines negligent entrustment as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use
of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely
because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom
the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is
subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
In seeking to interpret negligent entrustment to include the entrust-
ment of a chattel to a person likely to engage in criminal conduct,
the plaintiffs cited section 302B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which states that:
An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
27 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at Exh. C, Exh. I.
28 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 11.
2 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 11-13, Exh. C.
30 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 31.
"' Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint at 14 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum] (cit-
ing Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at 47-49).
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the conduct of ... a third person which is intended to cause harm, even
though such conduct is criminal.32
Previously, courts in several jurisdictions had applied negligent
entrustment doctrine to merchants for retail sale of firearms to un-
suitable purchasers such as children, intoxicated individuals, ex-
convicts, and persons acting suspiciously.3 No court prior to
Halberstam, however, had applied negligent entrustment doctrine to
a firearms manufacturer. In support of their attempt to convince
Judge Weinstein to do just that, the plaintiffs argued that the
Daniels, while manufacturers of the Cobray M-11/9 parts kit, also
conducted their own retail sales.34 The plaintiffs further cited sup-
posedly favorable precedent-two New York Appellate Division
cases and two New York trial court opinions-although none of the
cases cited involved firearm sales.3" One case concerned liability
for negligent entrustment of a firearm but not in the context of a
sale.36 The other three dealt with negligent sales of BB guns to
children. 7
In response to the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the defen-
dants filed a second motion to dismiss. 8 They asserted several ar-
guments countering the plaintiffs' contention that they owed a duty
to the public to take precautions against criminal misuse of the
Cobray M-1 1/9 parts kits that they manufactured and sold. First, the
32 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 21 n.14.
3 See supra note 10; see also WINDLE TURLEY & JAMES RooKs, JR., FIREARMs LmGA-
TION: LAW, SCIENCE AND PRAcTICE 94-95 (1988). See generally Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Handgun Manufacturer's or Seller's Liability for Injuries Caused to Another
by Use of Gun in Committing Crime, 44 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1987); James L. Isham, Anno-
tation, Liability of One Who Provides, by Sale or Otherwise, Firearm or Ammunition to
Adult Who Shoots Another, 39 A.L.R. 4th 517 (1986); Larry D. Schafer, Annotation, Lia-
bility of One Who Sells Gun to Child for Injury to Third Party, 4 A.L.R. 4th 331
(1981).
m Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 39 n.27, 37 n.24.
31 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 24, 37-39.
' Splawnik v. DiCaprio, 146 A.D.2d 333, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615 (3d Dep't 1989) (de-
fendant helped plaintiff's wife, who suffered from depression, load a gun which she
subsequently used to commit suicide).
17 Earsing v. Nelson, 212 A.D.2d 66, 629 N.Y.S.2d 563 (4th Dep't 1995) (defendant
sold BB gun to a 13 year-old); Sickles v. Montgomery Ward, 6 Misc. 2d 1000, 167
N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1957) (the father of a 9 year old boy and sales-
person knew that the father would subsequently entrust the air gun or BB gun to the
child); Henningsen v. Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547, 230 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1928) (defendant sold BB gun to 13 year-old boy).
I Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Third Complaint) [herein-
after Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss].
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defendants asserted that a manufacturer has no duty to refrain from
the lawful distribution of a non-defective product. 9 They pointed
to the "prolific commerce" in firearm parts and the exclusion of
these transactions from the extensive regulation of firearms in order
to show that no legal duty exists to refrain from such activity.4" In
response, the plaintiffs argued that the legality of an activity does
not preclude a negligence claim based on how it is conducted, and
common law may impose a duty of care beyond that mandated by
statute.4' The duty in Halberstam, plaintiffs emphasized, did not
demand that manufacturers refrain from selling firearms but required
merely reasonable care in promotion and distribution.4 2 For exam-
ple, this duty might require a firearms manufacturer to refrain from
touting the potential criminal uses of its products or to require
background information from purchasers at the time of sale.
Second, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' emphasis on
the dangerous characteristics of the Cobray M-11/9 and their ulti-
mate aim to stop the manufacture of it amounted to a products
liability claim for which they could not recover without alleging a
defective condition in the product that caused it to malfunction. 3
The plaintiffs responded that their claim was a negligence claim
based on the defendants' conduct, and hence, no showing of prod-
uct defect was necessary to support recovery.44 Defectiveness of
the product, they argued, was irrelevant to establishing the
defendants' negligence in marketing it.4" Furthermore, the plaintiffs
" Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 3.
0 Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 5. Defendants based their contention
that firearm parts are not covered by regulations governing firearms on an alleged lack
of federal and state efforts to restrict widespread and growing commerce in firearm parts
and on the definition of firearms in the U.S. Code as a frame or receiver and any com-
bination of parts from which a firearm can be assembled. See Defendants' First Motion
to Dismiss at 5-6 (citing 18 U.S.C. 921(3) (1995); 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) (1995); 27 C.F.R.
178.11 (1998); 27 C.F.R. 179.11 (1998)).
41 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 4, 28 (citing Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Weinstein, J.); Feiner v. Calvin Klein, Ltd., 157
A.D.2d 501, 501, 549 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (1st Dep't 1990); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein
& Sons, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 922, 923, 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Dep't 1967).
42 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 18.
4 Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 13-15. In arguing that the plaintiffs'
negligent marketing claim really amounted to an alternate pleading of design defect, the
defendants cited Judge Weinstein's opinion in the Hamilton case in which he discussed
the negligent marketing claims in Forni v. Ferguson and McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger &Co.
44 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 29.
" Plaintiffs Second Memorandum at 29-31; see also Plaintiffs' First Memorandum
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reiterated that the practical effect of liability under their claim
would be reasonable restrictions on promotion and distribution, not
an end to production and sale.46
Third, the defendants asserted that a manufacturer has no duty
to protect others from the criminal misuse of its products absent a
special custodial relationship between the manufacturer and the
injurer or a special protective relationship between the manufacturer
and the victim, and that no such special relationship was alleged by
the plaintiffs or supported by the facts.47 In response, the plaintiffs
argued that New York courts have imposed a similar duty upon BB
gun sellers to protect others from criminal misuse of the weapons
they sell, even absent a special relationship.48 This duty, they ar-
gued, arises not out of any special relationship but from the high
risk of injury from foreseeable misuse created by the retailer's con-
duct in selling weapons. 9 A special relationship, the plaintiffs ex-
plained, is necessary only in cases of nonfeasance, where the defen-
dant fails to intervene to prevent a third party from harming a vic-
tim, not in cases of misfeasance, where the defendant's conduct,
itself, creates or increases the risk of a third party harming a
victim."0
In their first motion to dismiss, the defendants had argued that
a duty on manufacturers to restrict the sale of gun parts to the gen-
at 4.
' Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 15-16. Like the defendants, the plaintiffs also
cited Judge Weinstein's opinion in Hamilton, noting that he distinguished the Hamilton
plaintiffs' negligent marketing claim from those in Forni and Sturm, Ruger & Co. and
refused to dismiss it. Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 31.
47 Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 12, 19; see also Defendants' First Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 11. The defendants noted that the foreseeability of criminal misuse,
which might give rise to a duty in other jurisdictions, is, under New York law, relevant
only in determining the scope of a duty not whether it exists. Defendants' First Motion
to Dismiss at 10-11, 18; Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss at 6 (citing McCarthy v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Strauss v. Belle Realty
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402, 482 N.E.2d 34, 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (1985); Pulka v.
Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 784, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1976)).
4 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 23-24. Plaintiffs relied on cases cited supra note
10.
49 Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at 5.
10 Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at 36-37 (citing Carrini v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp.,
158 A.D.2d 303, 550 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1990) (security firm not liable for injuries
caused by thief to bystander for failure to prevent flight of thief absent special relation-
ship between the security firm and the bystander); Connell v. Berland, 223 A.D. 234,
228 N.Y.S. 20 (1st Dep't 1928) (defendant, who left car unattended with key in the
ignition, liable for injuries to young child who started the car)).
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eral public could not be based on any analogy to negligent entrust-
ment doctrine. The defendants asserted that while this doctrine
might support liability in selling products to children, alcoholics or
those suffering from depression, it would not do so in selling to the
general public."s Negligent entrustment doctrine, explained the
defendants, applies only where the intended purchasers fall within a
group that "a reasonable person would consider lacking in ordinary
prudence." 2 The general public, whose behavior defines the stan-
dard of ordinary prudence, cannot as a group lack it. The plaintiffs
replied that the defendants' advertising campaign and distribution
mechanisms for the Cobray M-11/9 specifically targeted a pool of
purchasers likely to engage in criminal activity."
The defendants further argued that even if the court imposed
upon them a duty to exercise reasonable care, their marketing prac-
tices did not constitute a breach of that duty. In response to the
plaintiffs' allegations about advertisements for the Cobray M-1 1/9,
the defendants maintained that none of the ads was false or mis-
leading and none encouraged illegal use. 4 The plaintiffs replied
that the defendants' advertising and sales methods encouraged
criminal purchasers seeking to avoid licensing restrictions and back-
ground checks. 5 These restrictions, argued the plaintiffs, provide
evidence of the standard of reasonable care applicable in weapons
sales, and the jury could find that in avoiding such restrictions, the
defendants failed to exercise reasonable care.
In addition to their arguments addressing duty and breach, the
defendants also contended that regardless of the nature of their
conduct in marketing the Cobray M-1 1/9, this conduct did not
cause Baz's attack on the plaintiffs. First, Baz stated that he had
never seen an advertisement for the Cobray M-1 1/9, that he had
neither purchased it nor any parts for it directly from the defen-
dants, and that he had never heard of the defendants or their com-
pany. 6 Second, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs could
not produce evidence concerning how many parts of the gun used
s See discussion of negligent entrustment doctrine supra note 7.
52 Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss at 21 (citing Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F.Supp.
at 370).
s Plaintiffs' First Memorandum at 8.
s Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss at 19; Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss
at 12.
s Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 8-9.
s Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, 18.
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by Baz were marketed by the defendants or even that any single
part originated with the defendants.s7 The plaintiffs countered by
claiming that the defendants bore responsibility for these evidentiary
difficulties in establishing causation, and, therefore, the court should
shift the burden of proving causation onto the defendants under a
theory of market share liability." Lack of serial numbers on the
firearm parts, which were essentially fungible with those of other
manufacturers, made tracing them back to the defendants nearly
impossible. 9 Furthermore, during discovery the plaintiffs learned
that all of the defendants' sales records which might have been
relevant to the case had been destroyed in a flood and a sewage
backup.6 Thus, argued the plaintiffs, insofar as the defendants
were responsible for the lack of evidence relevant to causation and
controlled the market in Cobray firearms and parts, the burden of
proving causation should shift onto the defendants.6
Finally, the defendants argued that their marketing was not a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, asserting that Baz's attack
was an intervening cause that broke the chain of causation."2 In
the defendants' first motion to dismiss, they cited case law in sup-
port of the principle that an intervening criminal act is, as a matter
of law in New York, a superseding cause.63 The plaintiffs replied
by disputing this principle and arguing that according to New York
case law, the foreseeability of the intervening criminal act is a mat-
ter of fact for the jury, which determines whether the act is a
superseding cause.'
s Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 3 & nn.4-5, 18.
Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 32-34.
s9 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 38-39.
Telephone conversation with Steven J. Harfenist, counsel for the defendants Uune
15, 1998).
61 Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum at 32-44.
62 Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 20; Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss
at 12.
0 Defendants' First Motion to Dismiss at 19-20 (citing Jantzen v. Leslie Edelman,
206 A.D.2d 406, 614 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1994) (sale of a shotgun was not, as a
matter of law, proximate cause of subsequent shooting)).
" Plaintiffs' First Motion at 5, 23-29 (citing Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26,
33, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729, 462 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (1983)) ("When the intervening, inten-
tional act of another is itself the foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the
defendant who fails to guard against such conduct will not be relieved of liability when
that act occurs.'); Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 414
N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1980) ('"Where the acts of a third person
intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the causal connec-
tion is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the inter-
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At a hearing on February 19, 1998, Judge Weinstein denied the
defendants' second motion to dismiss.65 Again, despite a request
by the defendants, Judge Weinstein refused to issue a written opin-
ion."' The defendants, thereupon, petitioned the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus seeking to transfer the
case to another judge based in part on Judge Weinstein's repeated
refusals to specify prior to trial the legal duty that the defendants
owed to the plaintiffs.67 The Second Circuit refused to stay the trial
in order to consider the petition.68
The trial of Halberstam v. Daniel began on March 13, 1998.69
At trial both parties focused on the issues of causation and breach
of duty. First, the plaintiffs produced eye witnesses to the shooting
and ballistics experts to support their claim that the bullets that
killed Aaron Halberstam and injured Nachum Sosonkin came from
the Cobray M-1 1/9 and not from the other automatic pistol used by
Baz in the attack.7' Second, the plaintiffs presented testimony and
documentary evidence to show that the defendants dominated the
market in the manufacture and sale of M-1 1/9 pistols and parts to
sustain their allegation that the M-1 1/9 used by Baz was made up of
parts manufactured and sold by the defendants." In addition, they
pointed to the defendants' Cobray trademark engraved on several
principle parts that, assembled, made up the gun.7
Third, the plaintiffs offered a variety of evidence to bolster their
contention that the defendants were negligent in the manner in
which they marketed Cobray M-1 1/9 parts kits insofar as it was
foreseeable that the weapons would be purchased by individuals
likely to engage in criminal activity. They presented the expert
vening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the
defendant's negligence.").
I Transcript of Proceedings before the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, U.S.D.J., Feb. 19,
1998, 12:00 p.m. at 62 [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings, Feb. 19, 1998] (on file
with the author). The court considered this motion following discovery and treated it
procedurally as a motion for summary judgement. Transcript of Proceedings, Feb. 19,
1998 at 5.
" Transcript of Proceedings, February 19, 1998 at 64.
'7 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2 (on file with the author).
Telephone conversation with Steven Harfenist, counsel for the defendants Uune 15,
1998).
69 Transcript of Trial before the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, U.S.D.J, and Jury, Mar. 13,
1998, 9:00 a.m. [hereinafter Transcript of Trial] (on file with the author).
Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1532-36.
7, Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1562-63, 1573.
72 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1566-67.
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testimony of an academic and several law enforcement professionals
to establish that the Cobray M-11/9 was an unusually common
weapon in the commission of violent crimes and that all 3,074 of
the M-1 1/9 pistols recovered and traced in crime investigations from
1993 through 1998 had been manufactured by the defendants.73
The law enforcement professionals also testified that the design of
the Cobray M-1 1/9 made it unsuitable for sporting, hunting, or self-
defense.74 Its primary use, according to an article about the weap-
on in Machine Gun News, was "cleaning out a phone booth or an
elevator.""5 The plaintiffs also offered into evidence the ads de-
scribing the Cobray M-11/9 as "The Gun that Made the '80s Roar"
and touting "the controversial 'Drug Lord' choice of Cobray arms
throughout the '80s" with a cartoon of a gangster figure in the cor-
ner.76 The plaintiffs further introduced evidence describing the
defendants' sales methods which involved ordering by phone, post-
al delivery, bargain rates for bulk purchases, no requests for any
information other than that pertinent to payment and shipment, and
the failure to keep sales records.77 While federal law requires serial
numbers on gun frames, the defendants sold unmarked sheet metal
flats that, when folded, would serve as gun frames for their Cobray
M-1 1/9 parts. 8 Moreover, defendants Wayne and Sylvia Daniels
both testified that they did not care who purchased their weap-
ons.79 Finally, the plaintiffs produced testimony from a man for-
merly involved in the illegal sale of Cobray M-11/9 pistols to indi-
viduals and organizations involved in the drug trade. The man
described the ease and convenience with which he and a partner
had purchased and sold the guns over the course of several
years.8
In turn, the defendants first presented evidence that the bullets
that killed Aaron Halberstam and injured Nachum Sosonkin did not
come from a Cobray M-11/9. They introduced a videotaped con-
fession of Baz taken during the police investigation in which he,
I Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1543-46. The M-11/9 was banned in late
1994 by the federal government. Transcript of Trial at 1545.
'4 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1542.
's Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1542-43.
7 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1584.
Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1549-57.
'a Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1560, 1588. These flats did not have, nor
were they required under federal regulations to have, serial numbers.
79 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1557-58, 1584.
' Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1565.
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when asked about the weapons involved in the attack, named two
guns, neither of them a Cobray M-1 1/9.81 Second, the defendants
produced a firearms expert who testified that several principle parts
of the M-1 1/9 which the plaintiffs alleged Baz used in the attack
were, in fact, not from a Cobray parts kit similar to the one entered
into evidence by the plaintiffs.12 Furthermore, the defendants of-
fered testimony from Sylvia Daniels that the Cobray trademark was
widely counterfeited by other manufacturers.83
Third, the defendants offered evidence to refute the plaintiffs'
claim that there was anything negligent about their marketing of the
Cobray M-1 1/9. They produced their own statistics showing that an
M-1 1/9 was used in only one-seventh of 1 percent of crimes report-
ed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").84 A federal law
enforcement officer testified that guns recovered in criminal investi-
gations were rarely made from parts kits.8" The defendants also
presented a police officer who testified that he purchased a Cobray
M-1 1/9 for home protection.8" Moreover, a former assistant direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("BATF") testified that none of the Cobray ads constituted criminal
solicitation.87 The defendants insisted that the so-called "gangster'
in the ads was really a G-man.88
Finally, the defendants introduced evidence to show that Baz's
attack on the plaintiffs was not caused by any conduct of the defen-
dants. They submitted an affidavit and a deposition transcript from
Baz in which he stated that he had purchased an M-1 1/9 from
someone off the street, that he had never seen an ad for any Cobray
product, and that he had never had any business dealings with the
defendants personally or by proxy. He further testified that the
defendants did not influence him in any way to purchase firearm
parts.89 In their summation, the defendants emphasized that Rashid
Baz would have carried out his attack on the plaintiffs even if he
" Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1640.
82 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1623-24.
Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1627, 1635.
Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1620.
8 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1632-33.
Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1607-09.
87 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1630.
8 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1584. The term 'G-man' means a govern-
ment law enforcement official and was a term used in the 1930s to refer to agents of
the FBI.
89 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1641-43.
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had never obtained an M-11/9."° Holding the defendants liable for
the criminal attack of Baz, they argued, would be as unfair as hold-
ing liable the manufacturer of the automobile which he was driving
at the time.9'
Prior to closing arguments at trial, the defendants moved for a
directed verdict based on their argument that a manufacturer has no
duty to protect others from the criminal misuse of its products ab-
sent a special custodial relationship between the manufacturer and
the injurer or a special protective relationship between the manufac-
turer and the victim. As the plaintiffs alleged no such relationship,
the defendants requested that the judge rule in their favor prior to
jury determination of any factual issues.92 In response, Judge
Weinstein acknowledged the lack of any special relationship be-
tween the defendants and either Baz or the plaintiffs. Then, in a
highly unusual ruling, he insisted on withholding judgment on the
necessity of establishing such a relationship until after the jury re-
turned a verdict.93 The defendants objected to allowing jury con-
sideration prior to a judicial ruling on the threshold issue of duty.
Despite this objection, the judge proceeded to charge the jury on
the issues of breach, causation and damages. 94 Had Judge
Weinstein ruled in favor of the defendants on the issue of duty at
any time prior to sending the Halberstam case to the jury, he would
have been in accord with every state and federal court, including
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, that had ever considered a
negligent marketing claim against a firearms manufacturer." His
refusal to grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict marks
the first time such a claim has ever been submitted to a jury.
Following six hours of deliberations, the jury returned special
verdicts supporting judgment in favor of the defendants. The jury
found that the Cobray M-1119 caused the plaintiffs' injuries, and
that the defendants marketed the parts kit which "substantially con-
stituted" the weapon. In response, however, to the question, "Did
the defendants' negligence cause Aaron Halberstam's death?" the
'o Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1649-50.
" Transcript of Trial, Mar. 13, 1998 at 1636.
92 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 25, 1998 at 1462-64.
'3 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 25, 1998 at 1464, 1469, 1474.
94 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 26, 1998 at 1674-97.
91 See, e.g., supra note 6.
96 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 26, 1998 at 1697, 1731, 1740.
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jury answered "no."97 The jury responded similarly to the same
question regarding Nachum Sosonkin's injuries. Based on conver-
sations with the jurors after the trial, the attorneys for each side
agreed that the jury's verdict was driven primarily by a sense that
the defendants' marketing did not cause Aaron Halberstam's death
or Nachum Sosonkin's injuries.98 Several jurors expressed a belief
that had Baz not obtained a weapon made from the defendants'
parts, he would easily have obtained another and carried out the
attack. A number of jurors stated their belief that Baz's attack, not
the Daniels' marketing, really caused the death of Aaron
Halberstam. That is, the defendants' marketing was neither a but-for
cause nor a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs' harm.
II. THREE OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING A DuTY IN NEGLIGENT
MARKETING CASES AGAINST FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS
In the end, the Halberstam plaintiffs lost. By reaching the jury,
however, they provided a road map for avoiding dismissal of negli-
gent marketing claims and perhaps even charted a path toward
establishing a duty to exercise care in marketing firearms to the
general public. Like the Halberstam plaintiffs, future travellers on
this path will have to overcome three doctrinal obstacles erected by
prior case law. The absence of any written judicial opinion in the
case makes it especially important to examine these obstacles here.
The first obstacle was presented by the defendants' argument
against establishing a duty on the basis of negligent entrustment
doctrine. They asserted that negligent entrustment applies only
when a product is marketed to children or some other recognizably
high-risk group but not when the product is marketed to the general
public. Prior to Halberstam, courts often employed this argument to
justify the dismissal of negligent marketing claims against firearms
manufacturers.
This first obstacle was initially erected in the often cited case of
Linton v. Smith & Wesson.9 In Linton, the plaintiff, having been
9 Transcript of Trial, Mar. 27, 1998 at 1740-43.
Telephone conversations with Steven Harfenist, counsel for the defendants (June
15, 1998); Richard Davis, counsel for the plaintiffs Uune 16, 1998); Thomas Bar, counsel
for the plaintiffs Uune 16, 1998).
" 469 N.E.2d 339 (111. App. Ct. 1984). Many courts have followed Linton. See, e.g.,
Riordan at 1295; Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So. 2d 649, 650-51 (Fla. 1986); Knott
v. Liberty jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. 1988).
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shot by an intoxicated woman, sued the manufacturer of the gun,
arguing that the defendant had a "duty to use 'reasonable means to
prevent the sale of its handguns to persons who are likely to cause
harm to the public. ' " "1c In affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's claim, an Illinois appellate court held that there exist-
ed no Illinois precedent imposing a "duty upon the manufacturer of
a non-defective firearm to control the distribution of that product to
the general public" beyond the requirements of federal and state
statutory regulations, none of which the defendant violated.'
The Linton court distinguished an earlier Illinois case,
Semenuik v. Chentis, °2 which, relying on negligent entrustment
theory, "found that a retailer had a duty to the plaintiff to use care
in selling air rifles to persons whom the retailer knew would allow
their use by young children."' 3 In distinguishing Semenuik, the
Linton court pointed out that "Semenuik dealt only with the liability
of the retailer, and did not impose liability upon the manufacturer
of the air rifle or upon a remote vendor."' Retailers, unlike man-
ufacturers, deal directly with purchasers. Thus, retailers can more
effectively identify purchasers who are likely to misuse the weapons
they sell. Retailers can also more easily prevent sales to such pur-
chasers or offer additional warnings. By contrast, manufacturers are
often too removed from the point of sale to identify high-risk pur-
chasers or to take effective precautions that could prevent sales to
them.
The Linton court also argued that Semenuik imposed "liability
based upon the sale of toy weapons to children, a class of persons
known to be irresponsible in the use of such productsL]" whereas,
the Linton plaintiffs sought "liability based upon the manufacture of
products intended for distribution to the general public[.]" ' Chil-
dren, as opposed to the general public, are a readily identifiable
I- Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340.
101 Id.
102 117 N.E.2d 883 (III. 1954).
103 Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340. The issue on appeal in Semenuik was really proximate
cause and not duty. The court, however, in addressing the defendant's claim "that the
sale of the air rifle ...was not the proximate cause of the subsequent injury sustained
by the plaintiff," cited authorities on duty and its conclusion that the plaintiff's claim,
which stated a cause of action in negligence, implied that the defendant owed a duty.
Semenuik, 117 N.E.2d at 884.
104 Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340.
100 Id. The Linton court considered the BB gun in question-which was an air rifle as
opposed to a firearm-to be a toy weapon primarily intended for the use of children.
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group that consists of a greater than average number of individuals
likely to misuse weapons. Sales to children are negligent insofar as
they give rise to a higher than normal risk of injury. Distribution of
weapons to the general public cannot by definition involve such an
abnormal risk since it is the general public, itself, which serves as
the standard of normal risk.
Furthermore, the Linton court pointed out that the level of risk
in selling firearms to the general public is reduced significantly
through federal and state statutory regulation of firearm possession
and transfers. 6 Such regulations prohibit selling firearms to chil-
dren, drug addicts, mentally incompetent individuals, felons and
other groups consisting of a high concentration of persons likely to
misuse weapons. The Linton court implied that these statutory regu-
lations, which serve to filter out high-risk purchasers much as a
common-law duty of care would, make redundant any judicial
imposition of a duty.
The Linton court thus established three reasons for the inappli-
cability of negligent marketing doctrine to firearms manufacturers.
First, manufacturers have available no effective precautions that
might lower the risk of sales to potential criminals. Second, market-
ing weapons to the general public, who as a group define the stan-
dard of reasonable care, cannot entail an unreasonable risk of harm.
Third, statutory firearms regulations filter out high-risk purchasers,
thereby making gun consumers a low-risk group.
None of these three reasons applies to situations like that pre-
sented by the Halberstam case. First, the Halberstam defendants
were both manufacturers and retail sellers of the Cobray M-11/9,
and they could have taken precautions against purchases by crimi-
nals by using questionnaires, conducting interviews and background
checks, maintaining sales records and monitoring registration of the
firearm parts by serial number. Second, evidence at trial indicated
that the defendants may have had reason to know that purchasers of
the Cobray M-1 1/9 included a higher than average concentration of
individuals likely to be engaged in criminal activity. Third, by sell-
ing weapons in the form of parts kits, the defendants evaded
statutory firearms regulations that restrict distribution and sale.
The second obstacle to establishing a duty of care was reflected
in the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' negligent marketing
claim amounted to no more than a design defect claim, which
106 Id.
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required them to allege a defect in the weapon used by Baz. This
objection was most clearly articulated by Judge Weinstein, himself,
as dictum in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.0 7 Hamilton was filed shortly
before Halberstam and, as of the time of this writing, has still not
reached trial." 8
In Hamilton, the plaintiffs, representatives of people who were
shot and killed by individuals who illegally obtained handguns,
filed suit against handgun manufacturers under a mass tort theory.
Analogizing handguns and ammunition to pathogens such as asbes-
tos, Agent Orange, the Dalkon Shield and silicone gel breast im-
plants, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for negligently marketing
their weapons "in a manner that fostered the growth of a substantial
underground market in handguns."0 9 This market, the plaintiffs
claimed, made guns readily available to individuals who used the
guns to inflict widespread harm on innocent victims, creating a
major public health problem." 0 In addition, the plaintiffs set forth
claims based on design defect, ultrahazardous activity and fraud
theories."' The defendants, in moving for dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims, argued that they were engaged in the lawful man-
ufacture and sale of non-defective products. Judge Weinstein dis-
missed the claims based on design defect, ultrahazardous activity
and fraud but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with discovery on
the negligent marketing claim." 2 The judge indicated that the
court might recognize a duty upon manufacturers to take precau-
tions in the distribution of their weapons to retail firearms dealers,
and that the plaintiffs might be able, upon further discovery, to
provide evidence of a breach of this duty." 3
In allowing the Hamilton plaintiffs to proceed with their negli-
gent marketing claim, Judge Weinstein distinguished it from claims
in two recent cases in which New York state and federal courts had
dismissed negligent marketing claims against firearms manufacturers.
Both cases, Forni v. Ferguson". and McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger &
107 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
" The trial has been scheduled for January, 1999.
101 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1313-4.
110 Id.
"I Id. at 1314-5.
112 Id. at 1314.
113 Id. at 1316.
11 232 A.D.2d 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't 1996).
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Co.11 arose out of an assault on a Long Island Railroad commuter
train in which plaintiffs were shot by a fellow passenger using a
semi-automatic handgun loaded with "Black Talon" bullets which
are designed to expand upon impact in order to create a bigger
wound. In both cases, the plaintiffs sued under design defect and
negligence theories., In Forni, where the plaintiffs sued the manu-
facturer of the handgun, the court rejected both theories, refusing to
"impose a duty upon a manufacturer to refrain from the lawful
distribution of a non-defective product." 16 In McCarthy, where
the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of the ammunition, the court
refused to recognize a duty "not to produce ammunition with the
destructive capabilities of the Black Talon bullets."" 7
In accepting the plaintiffs' negligent marketing claim in Hamil-
ton, despite rejections of similar negligence claims in Forni and
McCarthy, Judge Weinstein explained that "under the facts of [Forni
and McCarthy, the plaintiffs' negligence claims] really amounted to
an alternate pleading of the product liability theory."" 8 "The mere
act of manufacturing and selling a handgun," he continued, "does
not give rise to liability absent a defect in the manufacture or design
of the product itself." 19 Thus, the negligence claims in Forni and
McCarthy were rejected for failure to allege a defect in the product.
Judge Weinstein's analysis in Hamilton establishes that the
negligence claims in Forni and McCarthy were really product liabili-
ty claims insofar as they sought to hold the defendants liable for the
manufacture and sale of the products in question, just like a claim
based on defective design. In Hamilton, by contrast, the plaintiffs
could argue for a duty to take precautions short of refraining alto-
gether from marketing the defendants' products. In that way they
could set forth a negligent marketing claim distinct from a design
defect claim. Thus, the Hamilton plaintiffs did not need to allege a
product defect in order to recover.
While Judge Weinstein's opinion in Hamilton clarified the
second obstacle to establishing a duty under negligent marketing
15 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
116 Fomi, 232 A.D.2d at 176-77, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74. The Forni court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' design defect claim and affirmed the trial court's
denial of the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint to add a negligence claim.
"1 Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. at 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
"8 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1323; cf. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 163
n.13 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting & rejecting this idea).
"' Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1323.
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theory (i.e. the need to prove a defect), it also indicated a way to
avoid this obstacle by alleging a duty of care short of ceasing pro-
duction. The Halberstam plaintiffs alleged a duty to adopt reason-
able restrictions on marketing which did not imply a judicial ban on
firearms. Thus, they avoided the need to prove a defect in the prop-
erly functioning Cobray M-1 1/9. Future plaintiffs in cases where
discrete features of a defendant-manufacturer's marketing strategy
are unreasonable could formulate a similarly limited duty.
The third obstacle to establishing a duty in negligent marketing
claims against firearms manufacturers was set forth in the
defendants' argument that a manufacturer has no duty to protect
others from the criminal misuse of its products absent a special cus-
todial relationship between the manufacturer and the injurer or a
special protective relationship between the .manufacturer and the
victim.12 Custodial relationships include those between parents
and their children and have been expanded to include those be-
tween psychiatrists and their patients.121 Protective relationships
include those between landlords and their tenants or school
teachers and their pupils.122
There are two ways to address this obstacle. First, as was the
case in Halberstam, plaintiffs may deny the need to establish a
special relationship where the defendant-manufacturer's own con-
duct created or increased the risk of criminal misconduct. Under
this approach, plaintiffs could argue that they do not seek to hold
defendant-manufacturers liable for the conduct of third party crimi-
nals but only for harms proximately caused by supplying easy ac-
cess to weapons tailored to criminal activity and encouragement to
use them accordingly.
Second, plaintiffs may allege that a manufacturer has a special
relationship with the public that would support a duty to take rea-
sonable precautions against criminal misuse of its products. In his
scholarly dissent in McCarthy, Judge Guido Calabresi pointed out
11o See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, supra note 13, § 33, at 201-03.
"1 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (therapist
has duty to wam third parties of threats against them by patient); Estate of Mathes v.
Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (duty of parents and grandparents to pro-
tect third parties from insanely violent person).
122 See, e.g., Bell v. Board of Ed. of the City of N.Y., 90 N.Y.2d 944, 687 N.E.2d
1325, 665 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1997) (duty of school to protect students from assault); Nallan
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980)
(duty of landowner to protect visitors from criminal acts of third parties).
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that products liability doctrine imposes liability on manufacturers for
injuries to innocent bystanders that result from product misuse by a
negligent purchaser, and that such liability rests on a duty that runs
from the manufacturer to the bystander.123 If the relationship be-
tween a manufacturer and a bystander supports a duty under prod-
ucts liability doctrine, it might support a duty of care in negligence.
Future plaintiffs might argue that the introduction of firearms into
the stream of commerce should carry with it some special
responsibility to the public.
Ill. REMAINING DIFFICULTIES AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
The Halberstam case helps define the challenges faced by
future plaintiffs bringing negligent marketing claims against firearms
manufacturers, and it raises several important public policy ques-
tions about the regulation of legal markets that provide products
frequently used in criminal activity. Future plaintiffs will have to
substantiate the alleged causal connection between the marketing of
firearms and injuries resulting from violent crime. They will also
have to articulate and justify a duty to exercise care in marketing
that extends beyond the specific and somewhat idiosyncratic facts
of the Halberstam case. From a public policy perspective, the desir-
ability of future litigation rests upon clarification of who ought to be
responsible for the role that legal firearms markets play in facilitat-
ing criminal activity and whether the tort system is an appropriate
institution for addressing this question.
The alleged causal connection between marketing firearms and
violent crime remains largely unsubstantiated. Common arguments
based on concurrent increases in firearm sales and violent crime in
the United States rely on a great deal of speculation.'24 In individ-
ual cases, the promotion, distribution or sale of any particular weap-
on is almost never a but-for cause of a crime committed with it,
given the ready availability of other weapons in stores and on the
12 Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 167.
124 See Randy Barnett & Don Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139, 1247-1251 (1996) (criticizing the widespread claim
that more guns produce more crime); cf. Markus Boser, Go Ahead, Make Them Pay: An
Analysis of Washington D.C.'s Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act, 25
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 313, 319 (1992); Stephen Teret & Garen Wintemute, Hand-
gun Injuries: The Epidemiologic Evidence for Assessing Legal Responsibility, 6 HAMUNE
L. REV. 341, 347 (1983).
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street. Juries are likely to find, as did the jury in the Halberstam
case, that had the criminal not purchased the particular gun in
question, he would have easily obtained another weapon with
which to commit the crime.
In exceptional cases, selling firearms may be considered a
substantial factor in bringing about injuries resulting from criminal
misuse of a gun, such as when a shooting occurs shortly following a
purchase. 2 ' Marketing firearms, however, is less likely to be
viewed as a substantial factor in bringing about injuries resulting
from criminal misuse. The effect of a manufacturer's promotion and
distribution on a criminal purchaser is never as closely linked to a
gunshot injury as is the retailer's sale when it is followed shortly by
a shooting. Furthermore, empirical evidence concerning the effects
of advertising on criminal behavior is notoriously controversial. 2 "
For these reasons, the Halberstam plaintiffs stressed that the defen-
dants, themselves, sold the Cobray M-1 1/9, and the plaintiffs em-
phasized those features of distribution that essentially constituted
sales practices. In this regard, the Halberstam case relied more on
allegations of negligent sale than negligent marketing. Even so, the
Halberstam plaintiffs failed to convince the jury on the issue of
causation.
Putting aside for a moment the difficulties of establishing cau-
sation, the issue of duty requires further clarification if Halberstam
is to provide guidance to future plaintiffs. The Halberstam plaintiffs
claimed that firearms manufacturers owe a duty to the public to
exercise care in marketing their weapons in order to prevent pur-
chase by individuals whom they have reason to believe are likely to
be engaged in criminal activity. Sometimes, the plaintiffs argued that
the defendants breached this duty by actively marketing to criminals
through their advertising and promotional schemes.'27 At other
times, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants breached this duty
by failing to prevent purchase by criminals, supporting this assertion
with the Daniels' testimony that they didn't care who bought the
2I See, e.g., Cullum & Boren-McCain Mall, Inc. v. Peacock, 592 S.W.2d 442 (Ark.
1980); Angell v. F. Avazini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1978).
2 See Clay Calvert, Excising Media Images to Solve Societal Ills: Communication,
Media Effects, Social Science, and the Regulation of Tobacco Advertising, 27 Sw. U. L.
REV. 401 (1998).
127 See supra notes 26-30, 76-78, and accompanying text; see also Andrew Jay
McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead, Long Live Negli-
gence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 806 (1995).
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Cobray M-1 1/9.128 If future plaintiffs allege that a defendant-
manufacturer's breach of duty consists of actively marketing to crim-
inals, then this will ease some of the difficulty of establishing causa-
tion. If plaintiffs can somehow prove that a defendant's marketing
efforts create a new market among individuals known to be likely to
engage in criminal activity who, but for the defendant's efforts,
would be less likely to purchase a weapon, or at least a weapon
with the firepower of the defendant's, then plaintiffs may be able to
convince a jury on the issues of breach and causation. Perhaps it
would even be enough to allege that the defendants merely play an
essential role in sustaining such a market. Following Halberstam,
plaintiffs will have to allege that defendants could avoid being
negligent by taking precautions short of refraining altogether from
selling the weapon.
Clearly, the problem with such an approach is its inapplicabili-
ty to the facts of most, if not all, marketing efforts by firearms manu-
facturers. It will be very difficult to prove-widespread accusations
notwithstanding-that firearms manufacturers actively seek to create
or sustain markets for their products among criminals. 29 Even
more difficult to prove will be that such marketing efforts are a
substantial factor in criminals' ability and desire to purchase compa-
rable weapons. Indeed, the more manufacturers there are participat-
ing in criminal markets, the less likely are plaintiffs' chances of
proving that any one manufacturer played a substantial role in a
particular purchase. This difficulty has led the Hamilton plaintiffs, as
well as some cities, to file lawsuits against a large number of fire-
arms manufacturers, alleging that collectively they created and
sustained the market for firearms among criminals. 3
Future plaintiffs might instead allege that a defendant-
manufacturer's breach of duty consists of a failure to prevent pur-
chase of its weapons by individuals whom it has reason to know
128 See supra note 79; see also Joshua M. Horowitz, Kelley v. R.G. Indus.: A Clause
of Action for Assault Weapons, 15 U. DAYrON L. REv. 125, 134-35 (1989).
129 See, e.g., Timothy Bunman, A Products Liability Response to Gun Control Liti-
gation, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 715, 721-22 (1995); David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities
Against the Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 TEMPLE L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1998); Morel, supra
note 2, at 283-84; Siegel, Liability of Manufacturers for the Negligent Design and Distri-
bution of Handguns, 6 HAMUNE L. REV. 322-23 (1983). For a response to these accusa-
tions see Donald Santarelli & Nicholas Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at
Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 476-478 (1983).
13 See Pam Belluck, Weary of Gun Violence, Chicago Considers Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1998, at A12; Kairys, supra note 129, at 5-12.
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are likely to engage in criminal activity. Plaintiffs are likely to find
substantial evidence to prove that many firearms manufacturers have
reason to know that their weapons are especially popular among
individuals likely to engage in criminal activity, and that they have
taken no measures to reduce purchase by such individuals.'
Rather than arguing that the defendant's marketing creates or sus-
tains a criminal market for its products, plaintiffs, under this ap-
proach, merely allege that the defendant exploits an existing crimi-
nal market for weapons similar to those it sells. The defendant en-
gages in legal profiteering off of the widespread criminal activity of
others. This approach to breach of duty, however, presupposes a
preexisting consumer demand among criminals for firearms, making
causation difficult to prove for the reasons mentioned above. Given
the widespread availability of firearms, if a particular criminal in
search of a gun did not purchase the defendant's particular weapon,
he could easily have purchased another.
Whether future plaintiffs allege that defendant-manufacturers
creates and sustains criminal markets for legal weapons or merely
take advantage of them, negligent marketing claims raise a more
general question of public policy: who is responsible for the role, if
any, that legal firearms markets play in facilitating criminal activity?
Even if one believes that legal firearms markets, by making weapons
widely and easily obtainable for both legitimate and criminal use,
play some role in facilitating criminal activity, there is still much
room for disagreement about who is responsible for these markets.
The actions of countless agents constitute and maintain firearms
markets: manufacturers, wholesale distributors, retail sellers, adver-
tisers, consumers, and regulators, as well as others who support the
activities of these agents, such as designers, lawyers, advertising
firms, and local government functionaries. The web of transactions
and supporting activities that constitute a market is very broad and
highly complex.
There are two general approaches in seeking an answer to such
question. One might begin with a macro perspective on how fire-
arms markets are created and sustained, and how they are related to
crime.'32 One could examine statistics concerning manufacturing
output, resources dedicated to promotion, distribution practices,
, See, Kairys, supra note 129, at 6-8.




sales levels, consumption patterns and crime rates. One might then
seek to identify statistical correlations between a particular group's
activity, such as advertising, and particular social phenomena, such
as the level of consumer demand or the rate of violent crime. One
might then suggest reasons for the correlations, for example, that ad-
vertising by manufacturers creates consumer demand for firearms,
always controlling for other factors which might otherwise account
for the correlation. Approaching questions of public policy from this
macro approach has traditionally been the province of legislatures
due to the resources required to gather the information and the
expertise necessary to analyze and debate it.
Alternatively, one might begin with a micro perspective by
examining individual cases in great detail in order to understand the
interactions of particular participants within the contexts of firearm
production, sale and criminal misuse. One could investigate the
promotional activities of a firearms manufacturer with regard to a
particular weapon and the effect of those activities on the decisions
of individual consumers to purchase and use that weapon. After
studying several cases, one might begin to generalize in an effort to
provide a more comprehensive account of how the activities of
firearms manufacturers affect criminal markets for the products they
make. This micro approach has traditionally been the province of
courts, which are especially well suited to undertake the detailed
examination of individual cases and filter out some of the bias that
often accompanies such a process through the rules of procedure
and evidence.
The process of addressing the question of who is responsible
for the role of legal firearms markets in facilitating criminal activity
will benefit by employing both a macro and a micro approach. Both
legislatures and courts have a place in determining an answer to
this question. Further statistical evidence and impartial analysis is
needed and so is a larger collection of individual case studies. The
impact of gun violence on life in our society will ensure that legisla-
tures continue to study the relation between firearms markets and
crime and will continue to provide statutory regulations in order to
place responsibility for preventing the problem where it belongs.
Tort litigation like the Halberstam case will continue to provide
detailed examinations of these relations as the courts seek to deter-
mine liability for the tragic results of the criminal misuse of firearms.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have consistently dismissed tort claims against firearms
manufacturers for injuries resulting from crimes committed with the
weapons that they sell. Yet, despite bleak prospects for success,
crime victims continue to bring such claims. The negligent market-
ing claim in Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., which survived dis-
missal by the judge only to be subsequently rejected by the jury,
signals the uncertain future of this kind of litigation. On the one
hand, the Halberstam case offers guidance to future plaintiffs about
how best to articulate a duty of care owed by firearms manufactur-
ers to the general public in marketing weapons. On the other hand,
the case provides a warning to future plaintiffs not to rely on highly
speculative causal arguments linking firearms manufacturers to
violent crime. Only further litigation will determine whether future
claims against firearms manufacturers hit their target or end up
being merely another shot in the dark.

